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TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE
LAW REVIEWS
Roger

J. Traynor*

When your Editor invited me to dedicate this tenth-birthday
issue with a discussion of what law reviews have to offer the legal
profession, he added that "you will enjoy this topic because of your
association with law reviews." By way of a clincher, he referred to
the law review I had once upon a time edited. Perhaps the reference
was intended to evoke green pastures of the past. It served instead
as a reminder that just when you are about to enjoy a topic, you
must reckon with free associations emerging from the bygones to
mingle obtrusively with the pleasures of the day. It is more fun
to dedicate law reviews than to edit them.
The tenth birthday of the UCLA Law Review signifies much
more than what humdrums rouse themselves to hail as a coming of
age, describing it indiscriminately as a graduation from infancy or
an entrance into maturity, with little to suggest any difference between the uncertainly executed Avanti's of crawling infants and the
studious sidesteps of the mature. This occasion is one for rejoicing
that there is a seasoned publication to represent a young but already
influential law school, strategically situated along the pacific coast
of a world as new in temper as it is old in time. It can come of age
not once but many times.
By coincidence there has been in the last ten years mounting
inquiry into the virtues and faults of law reviews. There are now a
great many newcomers along with the old-timers, and some say
there are too many. Their material resources vary widely. In the
main they depend on the bounty of universities and loyal alumni
along with the usual library subscriptions; rare is the profit that
turns up on their profit and loss statements. Their qualities vary
widely. In the main they have a regional rather than a worldly imprint, often enough of good quality. Even the best of them, however,
are subject to the fluctuations engendered by the short tenure of
temporary student editorial boards and the glacial changes for good
or bad in supporting faculties. All must compete with their goodly
numbers for the always rare contributions that may render an otherwise commonplace issue distinguished. It is a very American phe* Associate Justice, California Supreme Court, Editor-in-Chief, California Law
Review 1926-1927.
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nomenon that now and again an illuminated manuscript lights up
the pages of the most provincial journal. It is also very American
that in such a journal one may sometimes find an electrifying student note on a problem that the reputed peers among the journals
have left in outer darkness.
To the critics who say there are too many law reviews, defenders respond that there can never be enough of a good thing.
When the critics go on to deplore how far short of brilliant are
many law review pages, one is moved to concede and demur. By
definition, brilliance is rare; were it not, we would cease to be
dazzled by it. Of course the usual lead article will not be written
by one of the top ten stylists of the day. Of course the usual student
note will not reveal a legal philosopher fit to be tapped by the shades
of the most smashing thinkers of all time. Of course the usual book
review will not be composed by one in the throes of writing a great
book. Most of the pages will not make good hammock reading.
Most of them will lack wit, a gift the gods give charily. They will
not even be very funny. So what? Can we fairly ask of any publication that it be of high pitch from cover to cover, with a few laughs
for free? Is it not more than enough that between the covers of
many law reviews, and not always the same ones, the adventurous
can make one rewarding find after another? Would it not be enough
if they came across no more than provocative leads on problems
that defy solution by a single scholar, even the best?
The critics stand ready with one more carp, the most brutal of
all. What profit is in law reviews, in their proliferation of dull
learning, if most lawyers fail to read them? Even conceding the
assumption in this leading question, I would still demur. It would
still be enough that the law reviews are written, for however small
an audience. It would still be enough if they afford any student
equal to the task the opportunity to put his learning to the test by
original speculation and disciplined research and at last by the
transmutation of once freewheeling thought, roped in by studied
qualifications, into a usable written piece. Anyone inclined to
minimize the construction of even the most modest note should try
it himself sometime.
What one should hope for is not the diminution of law review
training but its extension to as many students as are willing and
able to benefit therefrom. They could be called upon to participate
in a variety of projects that would enrich the reviews as well as
themselves. Given the rigorous standards of admission to law
school, it appears increasingly mechanical to make first-year grades
the dominant criterion in the selection of the law review staff. It is
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not that too much training is given too early to too few. What
should concern us is that we may be failing to afford optimum
training to all students. It is upon them all that the reputation of
a law school depends, and they stand to enhance it according to
how well the school has developed their latent abilities. If they are
good enough to become lawyers they should be good enough to
contribute a mite, if only through a seminar-group study, to the
review that speaks for the school.
The law reviews that enable some students, and ideally should
enable all students, to refine and also to broaden their education,
render consequential service to the legal profession. You come to
know how far their influence reaches when you visualize the profession component by component. The test pilots of the reviews,
alerted by their training to both the potential of the law and its
shortcomings, disperse in many directions. Some elect to teach,
and they communicate to neophytes something of the earthy critical
spirit that makes education in an American law school one of the
most exciting in the world. Some bring their sharpened talents to
federal and state courts. Some bring them to their work as legislators or as counsel in public agencies. Not a few erstwhile note-writers
perform miracles of neology in private practice; if some let their
astute way with words descend into mere shrewdness or even
craftiness, there are always others who develop that astuteness into
something approaching wisdom.
Thus, even on the assumption that law reviews are more written than read, the evidence is overwhelming that their surpassing
standards of work redound to the benefit of the profession. In view
of his evidence I would not advocate liquidating a single law review, no matter how slender its resources or its subscription list.
With one determined editor it can still be a significant influence. The
massive lethargy that holds a community or a profession to mediocre
standards begins to dissolve when someone sets an example that
makes them suffer by comparison. There is always a reader somewhere to take heed and to give the alert to others.
No one knows, of course, how many readers there are. Some
of us, however, are fairly situated to guess at the trend. For whatever it is worth, I would conjecture out of my own experience that
the trend is up and that it is accelerating. There was a time in this
state, and not so many years ago, when any citation to a law review
gave an appellate court opinion an esoteric aspect. As late as a
decade ago, when this Review made its first appearance, the increase
in such citations had been substantial enough that they no longer
appeared outlandish. Nevertheless a strong sentiment persisted
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among members of both bench and bar that however permissible
such citations were, they were still offbeat, inferior to annotated
reports and cyclopedias, inferior to classic textbooks, and of course
inferior to anything and everything that passed as sage once it was
ticketed as the opinion of a court. That sentiment was dying hard;
but we had only to remember how strong is the hold of familiar
language. After all, the Early Modern English roughly associated
with the period from 1450 to 1750 gave way slowly to the speech
and the scribblings that began on the offbeat. Somewhere among
the Early Moderns of perennially old England the avant-garde were
stirring, forerunners of the law review men.
Even during the long period when law reviews went virtually
uncited, they were not unknown to judges. More than one law
review writer has been surprised to recognize pieces of his work
paraphrased or even lifted in a judicial opinion. The absence of
any citation to a scholar's work makes itself felt. The rationalization
has been that such work is outside the pale of authority, meagerly
identified with binding law. Then why is it used at all, even sub rosa?
The clumsy explanation is that if it persuasively sets forth what
should be authoritative, it may be transmuted surreptitiously into
what is by those in a position to declare the law.
If it is legitimate to make unacknowledged use of such work,
is it not a fortiori legitimate to use it openly? The courts have long
made open use of other writings that are no more authority than
law review pieces. They openly cite opinions of courts by which they
are not bound, those of other jurisdictions as well as of their own.
They openly cite dicta and also dissenting opinions. They openly
cite the annotated reports and cyclopedias. They are not above
citing textbooks. Why should there be any lingering abashment
about citing work from a law review that proves significantly helpful
in the construction of an opinion? Indeed, is it not a minimum
courtesy to do so?
It has happened to more than one scholarly writer for a law
review to find the influence of his work in the briefs of counsel as
well as in court opinions. It is reward enough to the typical scholar
that the ideas he has published in a law review prove useful in expediting, even in channeling, the research of a law office. Typically
also, he is generous enough not to expect wholesale citation of his
work, absent wholesale paraphrasing or lifting, even though it has
been most helpful to those who practice. For their part, many
lawyers have declared themselves deeply indebted to the reviews,
not merely for their spade work but also for searching analyses
of problems beyond the resources of the average office.
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There are others who, though they do not dispute the usefulness
of the law reviews, caution against open reference to them in briefs,
on two curious grounds. First, they envisage such a reference
breaking in on the consciousness of a judge set in his ways. He
becomes so distraught by what he regards as the impudent intrusion
of a professor type, or worse still, of a boy whose brain has not yet
been washed in practice, that he visits havoc upon the lawyer who
has caused him such unrest. The second vision is very different. The
law review citation now breaks in on the consciousness of a judge
so unset in his ways that the merest reference to a commentary on
binding law is likely to send him sprinting for the complete text. The
complete text educates him, alas, on the merits of the opponent's
case, and disaster falls on the poor lawyer who so innocently started
the judge on the downward path to learning.
If one is given to visions, these are unsettling enough. It is fair
to ask whether they are not ultra-visionary. The extraordinary imperviousness of the first judge to law reviews, their extraordinary
influence on the second, are at the distance of caricature from reality.
Such caricature is unimpressive to anyone who has observed the
steadily rising quality of American judges. Rare is the woodenhead
who still remains suspicious of learning beyond the borders of
binding law. Rare is the innocent in such awe of scholarship as to let
it prejudice his own judgment.
Perhaps the real message that the caricaturists seek to convey
is that the advocate should avoid offering any enlightenment that
would enable a judge to perceive more clearly his adversary's case
as well as his own. They are ill-advised who act upon such advice.
However short of brilliant the average judge may be, he has an
occupational alertness to the various strategies of adversaries and
particularly to the strategy of playing down the weaknesses of
their own side and playing up the weaknesses of the other side. His
primary responsibility is to ferret out the whole truth. The chances
are that sooner or later, skillfully or awkwardly, he may come close
to doing just that. No one is more aware than the judge that there
is usually a good deal to be said for both sides. He develops considerable skill in arriving at the crucial issues, nowadays with the
benefit of more help than formerly in the attendant task of research.
If the advocate apprises the judge candidly of the significant, however little known, commentary in a law review that exposes all sides
of a problem, he can at the same time anticipate the questions that
are likely to beset a judge as he reflects upon the case. Far better
for him to do so, and thus to expedite judicial understanding and
disposition of the case, than to gamble against increasingly heavy
odds that the judge will not come upon the revealing commentary.
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Far better for the advocate to take the initiative if only for reasons
of strategy, let alone loftier considerations.
For all the growing use of law reviews, there are intransigents
who remain suspicious of anything that depends in large part on the
efforts of the young, particularly if they are still students. They pay
no heed to the evidence that the average apprentice in an American
law school has long since reached the age of discretion and that he
is no ordinary student. He has behind him at least one undergraduate
degree and very likely a substantial work record and a period of
military service; moreover, he may be not only married but a
parent. As a condition of entrance into law school he has had to
present formidable qualifications. His very survival of the first year
is no mean feat. If in addition he also participates in the responsibilities of law review work he can hardly be dismissed as a callow
youth. There is in no other profession and in no other country anything to equal the student-edited American law review, nurtured
without commercial objective in university law schools alive to the
imperfections of the law, and alert to make space for the worthy
commentary of an unknown student as well as for the worthy
solicited or unsolicited manuscript of a renowned authority.
The quarrel of the intransigents with citations to law reviews
in briefs or court opinions reduces itself to a complaint that the
unknown, and particularly the young unknown, are not ready to
receive the accolade of citation. One may well ask why not. If a
commentary is of good enough quality to contribute significantly
to the construction of a brief or an opinion, why is it not good
enough to merit acknowledgment? Whatever added luster it might
have were it signed by one of established reputation, its value is
not one whit the less when it is the work of one as yet unknown. Of
what relevance is the obscurity of the contributor, or for that matter,
his age?
One so wholeheartedly for the law reviews, which usually have
the last word, may be permitted now to address a few observations
to their open-minded complaint departments. If you have heard
some of them before, they may still bear repetition. First of all, the
very grandness of your ventures should discourage resort to the
swagger and sneer, unpleasant signs of the inflated ego. It is not
very clever of the quick fox to watch himself in the mirror as he
sets out to jump over the shaggy dog. He is apt to jump instead
straight into the mirror. Likewise, space is too precious to waste
on a patronizing grading of court opinions as if they were so many
bluebooks. Such busy work of bumptious pedants or pretenders is
not becoming to law reviews. Now and again, of course, something
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appears in the reports so outrageous as to richly deserve rough
treatment, and the temptation to give it just that is great. Perhaps
a good rough rule would be to yield not to little temptations, but
only to the big ones.
I shall assume that the complaint departments have already
heard from more than enough people on the matter of style, including those who notably lack that grace even when they write
about it. I am no mentor on this chronic problem, which is not
peculiar to law reviews. On occasion I have commented on the
turbid paragraph or the turgid sentences or the hackneyed phrase;
but I remain mindful of how difficult it is for any of us to use
language with consistent skill. It looks as if cliches like corridors
of time are going to be around indefinitely, and we might as well
get resigned to wandering through them as best we can.
Given how much needs writing about, a law review should not
waste its space on the routine reporting of new decisions, a task
that appropriately belongs to legal newspapers. It should be on guard
also against wasteful coverage of what may already be amply
covered in other reviews. There must be ways of improving communication among reviews, not merely to preclude wasteful duplication but also to promote collaboration on timely problems of large
scope.
Sometimes a commentary is quite unjust to the judge. It is
not widely enough understood that in a case involving a statute a
judge may be bound by less than ideal statutory language. However unhappy he may be over a decision compelled by such language,
he is helpless to ameliorate the situation. Whatever criticism the
rule of law deserves should be directed at the legislature, not the
judge. It should also be more widely understood than it is that an
appellate judge is bound by the evidence in the reporter's transcript.
A minor matter of courtesy to judges bears passing mention. When
the critic of a majority opinion relies substantially on a concurring
or dissenting opinion in the construction of his comment he should
acknowledge that opinion. Noblesse oblige, as we put it in English;
or as the French would say, be noble.
Too often a commentator who has demolished the rationale of
an opinion then stands content among the ruins. Familiar as he is
with the terrain, why should he not now. suggest how to start out
with the job of rebuilding? The staple question after demolition
should be: What now?

What now? may well lead to legislative proposals. If ever we
needed the law reviews, it is in this area. It is an area that most of
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them have sadly neglected. They could if they would take the lead
on many timely problems with well-drafted proposals for legislative
consideration. They could do a job, and what a job it would be,
of analyzing statutes and administrative rulings as painstakingly
as they now analyze opinions. It would be a job such as could
absorb the talents of every student in every law school.
Time is with the law reviews. An age that churns up problems
more rapidly than we can solve them needs such fiercely independent problem-solvers preoccupied with long-range solutions. I salute
them for their already large contributions to legal education and
hence to the profession. I salute them for their already large contributions to law revision in the public interest. Particularly I salute
them as the best critics a judge could have.
May peace never be with you, lawyers to be. It is out of torment
that ideas emerge to give law a turn for the better.

